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INTRODUCTION 
Structural changes in grain markets, the lack of on-farm storage, 
increased farm price variability and the desire to separate the harvest 
delivery function from the pricing function have fostered the develop-
ment and use of delayed price (DP) as a method of exchange in grain 
markets. Delayed price is a marketing agreement whereby the seller 
(often the farmer) delivers grain and passes title to the purchaser 
(often a grain elevator), but reserves the right to price grain at some 
future date [Wills]. The seller prices grain in some agreed-to future 
time period by accepting the buyer's price bid for cash grain sales in 
that future time period. 
Until the seller elects to price the grain, prices vary as new 
market equilibriums are established. The seller of DP grain accepts a 
"long" cash speculative position and earns speculative profits as price 
increases. Sellers enter into delayed price agreements when storage is 
in short supply and futures prices are forecast to increase or basis is 
expected to strengthen. 
In contrast, the buyer of DP grain accepts a "short" cash specula-
tive position and earns speculative profits as price decreases. The 
buyer of DP grain minimizes futures price and basis risks associated 
with the speculative position by taking an offsetting long position in 
either the cash or futures market. Offsetting long cash market posi-
tions include storing grain, buying grain via a forward contract and 
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selling grain via a DP contract. Offsetting long futures market 
positions include buying grain via a futures contract or a commodity 
option. 
All price and basis risks are eliminated when the elevator or buyer 
elects to offset the short DP acquisition with a long cash marketing 
position. Selecting a long futures position eliminates the price risk, 
but not the basis risk. In the latter case, the buyer must forecast 
basis movements in an attempt to earn an acceptable margin for perform-
ing the merchandizing function. Buyers minimize basis risk by charging 
the seller a DP service fee equaling the expected change in basis. 
The delayed price selling method is used by farmers and elevators 
in at least 25 states. In 1977, for example, Ohio corn DP sales equaled 
16 percent of all corn marketings, DP sales in five states from the 
Midwest equaled 8.5 percent of all corn marketings and DP sales in seven 
states from the South equaled 2.2 percent of all corn marketings [Smith 
and Baldwin]. By 1982, Ohio farmers had expanded their use of DP corn 
sales to 28 percent of all corn marketings. In addition, 32 percent of 
all soybeans and 26 percent of all wheat marketings in Ohio were sold 
via DP [Ohio Grain Flow Study]. 
The widespread use of DP in the Midwest and South may subject large 
numbers of farmers to additional financial risk as this selling method 
separates the transfer of title from the pricing function. In addition, 
this selling method may influence price levels paid to farmers or may 
influence the local market basis. Because of the potential impact of DP 
on price levels and financial risk, the advantages and disadvantages of 
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this selling method are being debated by farm organizations, members of 
the grain trade and agricultural economists [IFBCD, Good, McKinstray, 
Sadler, Sharp, Weidner, Wills and Wisner]. 
Proponents of DP argue that the DP selling method improves grain 
merchandising operational efficiencies resulting in higher prices paid 
to farmers. The opponents argue that a local supply effect results in 
lower prices paid to farmers, and an unacceptable financial risk; the 
farmer is an unsecured creditor to the elevator until the gra~n is 
priced. These debates are contributing to the passage of state grain 
marketing legislation in Ohio, and other states to regulate DP contracts 
to better protect farmers and grain traders. Although the debate is 
intensifying and is circulating throughout the Midwest and South, the 
advantages and disadvantages of DP have been discussed only in the 
popular press and by legislators. To date, researchers have not 
examined the issues conceptually or empirically. 
This article develops a conceptual model to explain the economic 
effect of the DP selling method on prices paid to corn farmers by an 
elevator (the effect on local bases) and tests the theory using 
Granger's causality test. The empirical work focuses on the lagged 
relationship between DP sales (bushels of corn bought from farmers by 
one grain handler in a local market) and the resulting strengths or 
weaknesses in the local harvest basis for the 1977 to 1982 period in 
Ohio.l/ The harvest basis (October through December) is selected 
because most DP contracts are signed during this period [Smith and 
Baldwin]. Granger's causality test is used in this analysis to test 
autocorrelation and the lagged relationship between DP contracts and 
basis [Ashley et al., Barnett et al., and Granger]. In the following 
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sections of this paper, the DP arguments published in the popular 
literature are reviewed and are examined within the context of a 
conceptual model, the methodology and data are presented, the empirical 
findings are examined and the conclusions and implications follow. 
DELAYED PRICE CONTROVERSY 
The delayed price contract originated in the late 1940s ~n central 
Illinois. The concept received only limited attention until the 1960s 
when it was introduced to farmers in northwestern Ohio. With the 
increasing shortage of on-farm and grain elevator storage space and the 
introduction of unit trains, DP became a popular selling method through-
out Ohio, the Midwest and South during the 1970s [Smith and Baldwin]. 
Since DP was advertised as an alternative to commercial grain 
storage, this contract became synonymous with storage and was often 
misused by farmers and grain handlers. Opponents of DP articulated the 
differences between DP and commercial storage contracts focusing their 
attention on the financial issue. That is, the farmer is an unsecured 
creditor for the grain handler from the time the DP contract is signed 
and until the grain is priced. 
The proponents of DP did not debate the financial issue. Instead, 
they argued that the operational efficiency benefits (operational 
efficiency effect) from DP more than offset the increased financial risk 
assumed by the farmer. That is, the utilization of DP allows grain 
handlers to lower costs by more efficiently performing the transporta-
tion, financial, storage and merchandizing functions. Since they 
assumed that the use of DP contracts lowers operating costs, the 
proponents argued that farmers are paid higher grain prices as the local 
basis strengthens in the post harvest period [McKinstray, OFBF]. 
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Opponents countered the operational efficiency effect argument by 
reasoning that DP is inherently expensive, since this marketing method 
transfers the storage function from the production areas to processing 
and export centers [Good and Wills]. Further, they argued that the 
transfer of title from the farmer to the grain handler increases the 
available supply of grain (supply effect) to the market at critical 
times during the year. The storage inefficiencies and the increase in 
supply diminish prices paid to farmers who are selling via cash con-
tracts or weakens the local basis [Good and Wills]. 
Conceptual Model 
The supply and efficiency effects of DP on corn prices are examined 
graphically in Figure 1. It is assumed that the market equilibrium is 
established pr~or to the introduction of DP contracts. Then, the supply 
effects of DP are introduced by substituting, both cash gra~n sales and 
stored grain for DP sales. Finally, the efficiency effect of DP is 
examined. 
In Figure 1, the markets are in equilibrium for cash gra~n sales 
where DP contracts are not traded ~n the local market, an arena where 
elevators and processors buy corn from farmers. Panel A of Figure 1 
portrays the quantity of corn stored by farmers in time period (t). It 
is assumed that the total quantity supplied at harvest (sLt) in the 
local market is fixed.2/ The local storage function (I1 t) is inversely 
related to price. In this example, the quantity stored equals (QstL) 
when price equals zero and zero when price equals (pL''t). 
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In Panel 8 of Figure 1, the total quantity of corn supplied by 
farmers in the local market is given by the function (sLmt). When all 
corn sold is by cash sales, the function (sLmt) is equivalent to the 
cash grain sales function (SLCt). Both (sLmt) and (SLCt) are functions 
of local market price. 
When the local market ~s in equilibrium, quantity (QLmt) is 
exchanged at price (pLt) and quantity (Qrt) is stored (Figure 1, Panels 
A and B). By definition, this (QLmt) plus (q1t) equals the total local 
harvest supply (sLt). 
Panel C of Figure 1 portrays the regional market. It is assumed 
that this is a competitive market in which the regional supply function 
(sRt) is comprised of the sum of the individual local market supply 
curves. The X axis ~n the regional market is shifted below the corre-
sponding X axis of the local market and represents the cost to transfer 
corn from the local market to the regional market (OZ).21 Based on 
these assumptions, (QRt) is exchanged in the regional market at price 
(pRt). 
Specific Assumptions for DP Analysis 
For this analysis, it is assumed that farmers have three marketing 
alternatives- sell corn at harvest (cash sale contract, CS), store for 
future sale (store), or sell via a DP contract.~/ A competitive 
bid-offer market exists. Grain handlers bid prices to farmers by 
subtracting the local basis from the nearby futures price. As the local 
market supply-demand relationships change, grain handlers vary the local 
bid by strengthening or weakening the local basis.5,6/ The impact of DP 
contracts on price or basis is examined by first substituting the DP 
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contract for the CS contract and then for storage. The impact of the 
assumed improvement in operational efficiency (the proponents argument) 
on price or basis is then examined.2} 
Substitution of DP Contracts for CS Contracts 1n the Harvest Period 
Assume that farmers substitute DP contracts for CS contracts in 
order to capture higher prices in a future time period. The quantity of 
corn sold via DP contracts will be a direct function of future price 
expectations and an indirect function of the elevator's DP service 
charge. Farmers will increasingly substitute DP sales for CS contracts 
as price expectations for the future increase and the elevator's current 
DP service charges decrease. 
With the total local supply of corn at harvest assumed to be fixed 
at (q8tL)and the substitution of DP contracts for storage excluded, each 
bushel of corn marketed via DP diminishes cash grain sales by one bushel 
in the local market. The quantity of corn sold via DP contracts in 
response to future price expectations and the DP service fee is 
QL"mtqLmt, and the CS function shifts to s1 'ct (Figure 2, Panel B). The 
quantity of DP corn sales (q1"mtq1mt) is not priced by the seller or 
farmer but in effect moves through the local market at price (pLt). The 
total marketing function (s1mt) and the demand function Cn1 t) remain 
unchanged. The elevator ensures that it pays the farmer the current 
local market price (pLt) for the DP grain by selling the DP grain in the 
regional market at price (pRt) and hedging its position in the futures 
market. 
Since DP and cash grain are exchanged in the local market for price 
(pLt), the effective local demand function is the line segment 
(pLt ADLt) (Figure 2, Panel B). Cash grain sales are in equilibrium as 
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" t the quantity supplied equals quantity demanded (OQL m ) at price (p1t) 
and the quantity stored equals (OOrt) (Figure 2, Panels A and B). Since 
the regional supply and demand curves are unchanged, the equilibrium 
conditions are (pRt) and (QRt), respectively (Figures 2, Panel C). 
Assuming a one-for-one bushel substitution of DP sales for CS 
occurs, the total supply of grain is fixed and DP sales are not 
substituted for stored grain, the market equilibrium prices in the local 
and regional markets are not modified. Therefore, when DP substitutes 
only for CS on a one-to-one basis, there are no local nor regional price 
effects. In this case, DP has no effect on the local basis. 
Substitution of DP Sales for Storage in the Harvest Period 
In this case, farmers substitute DP sales for storage in order to 
speculate on price movement while avoiding the risk of product deterior-
ation and the associated storage cost or commercial storage charge 
[Good]. Each additional bushel of corn marketed via a DP contract 
decreases the grain stored by farmers by one bushel in the local market. 
The substitution of DP sales for stored grain shifts the storage 
function from (rLt) to (IL't), and the marketed grain supply function 
shifts from (s1mt) to (s1 'mt) (Figure 1, Panels A and B). The new 
, It I I I t 
equilibrium price and quant~ty are (PL ) and (QL m ) in the local 
market. The demand function shifts to (p1 't A'n1t). 
Based on the cash sales supply function (s1 'ct), the farmer 
I I II t 
supplies (OQL m ) of cash sales, which is a decrease in the quantity 
supplied equal to (QL'' ''mt q1 ''mt). Cash sales or the quantity 
I I I I t I 
supplied (OQL m ) equals the quantity demanded at price (PL t) where 
the cash sales supply function (s1 'ct) intersects the demand function 
(pL'tA'nLt). The residual supply of grain or delayed price grain 
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(QL 1111mtQL 111mt) is not priced by farmers, but is effectively priced at 
(PL 1 t) assuring that the elevator stores the grain or sells in the 
regional market and takes a hedge position. The quantity stored by 
farmers at price (PL 1 t) is (0Qr 11 t) (Figure 1, Panels A and B). 
Two outcomes are possible in the regional market. First, if grain 
elevators store the additional DP acquisition in the local market, the 
regional supply function (gRt) and the equilibrium conditions 
(pRt, OQRt) are unchanged. Since the equilibrium price in the local 
market decreases, the price differential between the local market and 
the regional market increases by (BC) (Figure 1, Panels Band C). This 
differential (BC) represents the theoretical storage cost to transfer 
grain through time until it is sold in the regional market. The total 
differential between the two markets is (BC), storage cost, plus (OZ), 
transportation cost. 
For the second outcome, the grain handler may transfer the addi-
tional DP grain to the regional market which shifts the regional supply 
curve to (SR 1t), (Figure 1, Panel C). This outcome decreases the 
equilibrium price in the regional market to (PR 1 t) and increases the 
quantity supplied and demanded to (OQR't). The price differential 
between the two markets again equals (OZ). 
A partial transfer of DP grain into the regional market shifts the 
regional supply function to a location in between (sRt) and (sR't) 
resulting in an equilibrium price that is greater than (PR 1 t) and less 
than (pRt). The equilibrium conditions in the local market would be 
unchanged; however, the quantity stored by grain elevators would be 
I I I 1111 t If t greater than zero but less than (QLmt~ mt + ~ m ~ m ). 
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The substitution of the DP selling method for the storage function 
increases the supply of grain in the local market establishing a lower 
price or a weaker basis. In addition, DP sales are substituted for cash 
grain sales because the quantity of grain sold decreases with the price 
decrease. This substitution effect substantiates the argument that the 
introduction of DP sales weakens the basis in the local market. The 
theoretical impact of DP on price and basis is indeterminant for the 
regional market. 
Operational Efficiency Effect 
Grain handlers tender delayed price contracts to farmers to acquire 
title to corn, to extract corn from storage and to acquire interest free 
short term unsecured loans. The quantity of corn bought via DP contracts 
is a direct function of the buyers' existing and expected sales commit-
ments and the anticipated improvement in operational efficiency from a 
reduction in financial, storage and transportation costs. Financial 
costs decline because the grain handler is acquiring an unsecured 
interest free loan until the farmer prices the corn. Storage and 
transportation costs decline because the grain handler owns the grain 
making it possible to more efficiently schedule the use of transporta-
tion and storage equipment. 
Prior to the introduction of the operational efficiency effect, it 
is assumed that the DP substitution effects for cash grain sales and 
stored grain are in place. Further, the assumed equilibrium in the 
regional market is established by the demand function (DRt) and the 
supply function (SR't) (Figure 1, Panel C). Grain elevators, then, are 
not storing the additional DP grain from the storage effect. In 
equilibrium, the regional grain price equals (pR't), the quantity traded 
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equals (OQR't) and the price differential between the regional and local 
markets is (OZ). 
In the local market, the equilibrium is established by the market 
supply function (s1mt) and the demand function (p1 'tA'n1t); the quantity 
stored by farmers is determined from the storage function (I1 1 t). In 
equilibrium, the local grain price equals (pL't), cash sales equal 
(OQ11"'mt), DP sales equal (QL""mtqL 11 1mt), the total quantity of 
I I I t . II t 
marketed corn equals (OQL m) and the quant~ty stored equals (OQ1 ). 
To illustrate the operational efficiency effect, assume that the 
competitive forces in the market transfer the benefits back to the 
seller or farmer in the local market as higher prices or a stronger 
basis.~/ For this case, the demand curve in the local market theoreti-
cally increases to (DL 1 t) (Figure 4, Panel B.) 
Prices in the local market increase to (pLt), the total quantity of 
• I I I II t 
marketed corn ~ncreases to (OQ1 m ), the quantity of corn stored by 
farmers decreases to (OQI 1 t), the quantity of cash grain sales in the 
• I I t . I I t I I I I I t local market ~ncreases to (OQ1 m ) and the quant~ty (~ m Q1 m ) 
is exchanged via DP sales. Higher prices paid to farmers from the 
operational efficiency effect decreases the quantity of corn stored by 
farmers and increases the quantity of cash and DP sales. If grain 
handlers store the newly acquired grain, prices in the regional market 
are unchanged. Transferring all or part of the additional grain to the 
regional market would alternatively decrease the price as the regional 
supply function shifts to the right. Based on the stated assumptions, 
the operational efficiency effect supports the view that local price or 
basis is strengthened. 
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The potential collective impact of the substitution and operational 
efficiency effects on price or basis in the local market is inconclu-
sive. If the hypothetical change in the supply function (sL'mt) from 
the substitution effect is greater than (less than) the hypothetical 
change in the demand function to (DL't) from the efficiency effect, the 
local market price decreases (increases) or basis weakens (strengthens). 
Methodology and Data 
The statistical causality test proposed by Granger is used to 
determine the impact of DP sales on basis for a local elevator.9/ If 
basis weakens (strengthens) as DP sales increase for a specific year, 
the substitution (efficiency) effects are greater than the efficiency 
(substitution) effect. If basis does not change as DP sales increase for 
a specific year, this implies that the substitution effects offset the 
efficiency effect or that no lagged relationship exists. 
These lagged relationships are examined using the definition of 
causality as set out by Granger. In the Granger sense X (DP) causes Y 
(Basis), if knowledge of X statistically improves the ability to predict 
Y, after accounting for the information contained in past values of Y 
[Granger, 1969). In this sense, questions as to the "true meaning of 
causality are sidestepped" and causality between variables is explicitly 
defined. Causality can be either undirectional, bidirectional, and/or 
instantaneous. Granger proposed the following general test for caus-
ality between two 
(1) xt = 
(2) = 
stationary time 
M 
t 
j=l 
M 
t 
j=l 
a. xt . + J -J 
c. yt . 
J -J + 
series: 
n 
r 
i=l 
n 
t 
i=l 
b. y . 
l t-1 + e t 
d. X . + u 
1 t-l t 
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where the classical assumptions on the stochastic properties of e and u 
are expected to hold. The parameters of (1) and (2) are estimated by 
applying ordinary least squares. The test of causality is then defined 
on the joint significance of the estimated parameter sets a, b, c, and d 
[Granger, 1969]. For example, if the set b is not significantly 
different from zero, then the null hypothesis that Y does not cause X is 
accepted. Likewise, if the set d were not significantly different from 
zero, then the null hypothesis that X does not cause Y is not accepted. 
In this case the two series would be sample-wise independent. 
This notion of causality was modified by Sims to include the 
concept that the future does not cause the past and that a stochastic 
stationary series Y 11 can be expressed as a distributed lag function of 
current and past (but not future) X, ...• , if and only if, Y does not 
cause X in the Granger sense [Sims, 1979, pp. 444-445]. In recognition 
of the effects of serial correlation of the residual series on the 
significance test, Sims proposes a method to filter the data to correct 
for this. Keeping in mind the advantages and limitations of this 
notion, as identified by Geweke, Meese and Dent, the Sims procedure was 
chosen to investigate the statistical causality or the lagged relation-
ship between DP and the local market basis. 
The empirical procedure consists of regressing the current 
observations of the local harvest basis (the dependent variable) on its 
own past observations as well as past observations of the number of 
bushels of corn delivered v~a DP sales. To estimate the causal struc-
ture annually for each of the harvest periods from 1977 through 1982 
(excluding 1979), the parameters of the following dynamic regression are 
estimated with ordinary least squares:~/ 
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m 
( 3) -B = a + 1: r)1.liB + LIt t 10 i=l t-1 
m n 
(4) -B a 20 + z at. 2i B + E y .DP .+ E 2t · t i-1 t-1 t=j J t-J , 
where Bt = basis in cents per bushel under the nearby futures in 
period t .:!} 
DPi-j = the number of bushels of corn delivered via DP contracts 
in period t 
m = total number of lagged periods of basis 
n = total number of lagged periods of DP sales 
i and j = ith and jth lagged periods. 
alO• azo and j are dynamic regression parameters, and lt and 2t are 
white noise residuals.l2/ 
Values of m and n in equations (3) and (4) may be chosen from 
apriori knowledge of leads and lags or via a joint F test [Barnett et 
al.]. Because of the absence of prior knowledge, the F test was used to 
identify the significant number of respective lags for both basis and 
DP. The selection of too few or too many lag variables may result in 
significant serial correlation in the error structure and bias the F and 
t statistics [Pierce and Haugh]. Thus, it may be concluded that a 
lagged relationship exists between DP and basis when, in fact, this 
relationship does not exist. Two tests are performed to detect serial 
correlation in the error structure. The first test is an F-test based 
on the estimated residuals obtained from the least squares regressions 
(equations 3 and 4). An autoregression of these residuals lagged five 
periods is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) as follows: 
(5) e t = 
where: 
a 
a + 
0 
et 
b. 
o' l 
i 
= 
= 
= 
s 
Eb .e 
l i=l 
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t-1 
current residual sertes 
parameter estimates 
ith lagged residual 
estimated by OLS 
The significance of the estimated parametes can be judged by the joint 
F-Test. In addition, the Box and Pierce Q test is also used to detect 
significant serial correlation [Barnett et al.). 
Should these tests reveal significant serial correlation in any of 
the residuals, a filter of the following form is used to transform both 
variable series to white noise [Sims]. 
(6) (I - KL)N 
where K = . 75 
L = lag operator 
N = number of lags 
The order of filter needed to "whiten" the series is determined by 
checking the order of significant coefficients on the lagged residuals 
in the autoregression (equation 5). If the estimated residual lagged 
four periods is significant, then a fourth order expansion of Sims 
filter is used [Bishop]. If a Sims value of • 75 does not "whiten" the 
series, different values of k are tried. Models in which significant 
serial correlation cannot be removed are excluded from the causality 
tests. 
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Data 
The lagged relationship between DP and basis is determined for 
each harvest period (October through December ) from 1977 - 1982 
(excluding 1979), using the December futures corn basis as the dependent 
variable. For each of the five years, daily cash corn price bids to 
dealers were collected from one northwestern Ohio elevator and were 
used as a proxy for daily bids to farmers.l3, 14/ In addition, the 
daily volume of DP corn deliveries (the independent variable) and daily 
delayed price service fees were recorded. Daily December futures price 
data were obtained from Chicago Board of Trade publications. The daily 
December basis was calculated by subtracting the futures price from the 
cash corn price bid [Neely]. 
To broaden the empirical analysis, attempts were made to collect 
similar data from other firms; however, daily delayed price sales data 
were unavailable or were incomplete. The daily corn price bids and DP 
service charge data collected from the one firm should represent local 
market conditions as a large number of other competing firms in the 
market area also provide DP contracts as well as other similar marketing 
alternatives and services to their customers. Co~petitive pressure, 
then, would cause price bids and DP service charges of this one firm to 
equal or approach those generated by the local market economic condi-
tions. 
Empirical Results 
The causality test described in the methodology section was 
completed for the 1977 through 1982 period. The dependent variable 
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(basis) is regressed on past values of basis, lagged the appropriate 
number of periods, and then ~s estimated with the lagged independent 
variables (DP) added to the model. 
Based on the F tests for each year, the selected number of lags for 
bases equaled two for 1978, 1980 and 1982, respectively, five for 1977 
and seven for 1981 (Table 1). The selected number of lags for DP sales 
equaled zero for 1978, two for 1981, three for 1977, four for 1980 and 
six for 1982. For the periods 1978 through 1982, using the Box-Pierce 
Q statistic, serial correlation was not a problem. For 1977, based on 
the Q statistic, serial correlation was significant. After applying 
Sim's filtering procedure, white noise could not be established for the 
ser~es. Therefore, the period 1977 was excluded from the analysis. 
A second F test as reported in Table 2 is performed to test the 
null hypothesis that the independent DP variables jointly are insignif-
icant in the model. This F test is performed by calculating the 
reduction in the sum of squared error (SSE) resulting from the addition 
of the independent DP variables to the equation. If the F statistic is 
significant, the null hypothesis that the reduction in the SSE is due to 
random chance 1s rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that 
the reduction 1n the standard error is due to the addition of the 
independent DP variables. Therefore, a significant F statistic 
indicates that the independent DP variables "cause" changes in the 
dependent basis variable in the Granger sense. 
There are four possible causal outcomes between DP and Basis. 
These are i) basis causes DP, ii) DP causes basis or the substitution 
effects (efficiency effect) are greater than the efficiency effect 
(substitution effect), iii) a causal relationship does not exist or the 
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substitution effects offset the efficiency effect, and iv) a bidirec-
tional flow is present (basis and DP simultaneously cause each other). 
Since the F tests for Basis causes DP were not significant, we conclude 
that basis does not cause DP in the Granger sense (Table 2). Further, a 
bidirectional flow was not evident in any of the models tested [Neely]. 
DP + B( 1981 and 1982), DP Causes Basis for 1981 and 1982 
The significant F test of 5.2 for the 1981 model and 2.27 for the 
1982 model indicates that DP causes basis in the Granger sense in each 
of these years (Table 2). By setting the delayed price independent 
lagged variables in each of the models to a value greater than zero 
(shocking the system), it can be determined whether basis weakens 
(substitution effects are greater than the efficiency effect) or 
strengthens (efficiency effect is greater than the substitution effects). 
1981 Time Period 
For 1981 it is assumed that this elevator buys 5 million bushels of 
DP grain in time periods one and two, respectively. A relatively large 
value is assigned to the DP variables to graphically illustrate the 
substitution and efficiency effects. That is, the lagged DP variable 
coefficients generated by the 1981 mode are relatively small (Table 1). 
Further, it is assumed that all lagged basis variables equal zero; 
therefore, in period one basis equals -2.07 cents or is equal to the 11 ~ 1 
coefficient (Figure 2 and Table 1). In time period two, the increase in 
DP acquisitions weakens the basis. Therefore, the substitution effect 
is greater than the efficiency effect or DP sales by farmers are being 
substituted for stored grain (Figure 1). In time periods two through 
four, the basis strengthens or the efficiency effect is greater than the 
substitution effects. In time period five, the DP lagged variables 
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equal zero and basis is again equal to the "a" coefficient. Aggregating 
across the five time periods, basis strengthens more than it weakens; 
therefore, the total efficiency effect is greater than the substitution 
effects (Figure 2). 
Structurally, the following may explain why the aggregated effi-
ciency effect was greater than the substitution effects for 1981. Corn 
exports and domestic demand were relatively large [Henderson and USDA]. 
Total corn production in Ohio declined from 440 million bushels in 1980 
to 360 million in 1981, and soybean production also declined. There-
fore, the total supply of corn and soybeans equaled 96% of the total 
storage capacity. Given the increase in demand, the decrease in supply 
and an adequate supply of storage space, the elevator may have passed 
back all or part of the improved operational efficiency effect as higher 
prices paid to farmers to acquire more corn via cash sales to meet its 
export and domestic demand commitments. The zero DP charge in October 
1981 and the corresponding DP charges for November and December suggest 
that this elevator had to stimulate grain movements to acquire an 
adequate supply of corn to meet demand commitments (Table 3). 
1982 Time Period 
For 1982, it ~s assumed that the elevator buys 500 thousand bushels 
of corn during periods one and two, respectively. A smaller value is 
assigned to the 1982 DP lagged variables relative to 1981 to graphically 
illustrate the substitution and efficiency effects (Figure 2). This is 
possible because the lagged DP variable coefficients generated by the 
1982 model are relatively larger than those generated for 1981. 
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Further, it ta~es nine periods to illustrate the aggregated effects for 
1982 relative to five for 1981 Rs the 1982 model contains six DP lagged 
variables while the 1981 model contained only two lagged DP variables. 
In period one, basis equals -2.08 cents or the "a" coefficient for 
the 1982 model (Figure 2 and Table 1). In time period two, the increase 
in DP acquisitions weakens the basis, or the substitution effects are 
greater than the efficiency effect. Thereafter, basis strengthen (the 
efficiency effect is greater than the substitution effects for periods 
three through eight) until the DP lagged variables again equal zero. 
For the nine periods, the total aggregate efficiency effect is greater 
than the substitution effects. 
Structurally, the following may explain why the aggregated effi-
ciency effect was greater than the substitution effects in 1982. Corn 
exports and domestic demand were relatively large. Ohio had a record 
corn production in excess of 456 million bushels. Since soybean 
production was also relatively large, the total supply of corn and 
soybeans was 121% of available storage capacity. Farmers acquired CCC 
loans on relatively large quantities of corn so the available "free 
supply" remained relatively low. Given the relatively large demand and 
the relatively small free supply of corn, the elevator may have passed 
back part or all of the improved operational efficiency effect as higher 
prices paid to farmers to acquire corn via cash sales to meet its total 
demand commitments. 
During October, when the supply of corn and soybeans exceeded the 
available storage space, DP charges to farmers were relatively large 
(Table 3). During November and December, the DP charges were lowered 
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significantly to move grain out of farm storage and into the marketing 
channels to meet the elevator's sales commitments. 
No Causal Relationship (1978 and 1980) 
In two years (1978 and 1980) both F statistics are insignificant at 
the .OS level, implying no causal relationship between DP sales and 
harvest basis (Table 2). This implies that the substitution effects 
equaled the efficiency effect or that no causal relationship exists (the 
substitution and efficiency effects each equal zero). 
1978 Time Period 
In 1978, production of corn in Ohio was relatively low, equaling 
379 million bushels. Since soybean production was also relatively small, 
adequate storage space may have been available. Most of the corn supply 
was available for sale as the federal feed grain program was curtailed 
and most Ohio farmers did not participate. These data suggest that 
farmers may not have substituted stored corn for DP sales in 1978. 
Therefore, basis would not have weakened in the corn market. 
If the supply of corn provided via DP contracts and cash sales 
equaled the demand for corn, the elevator may not have passed back all 
or part of the efficiency effect as higher prices to farmers. There-
fore, the basis would not have strengthened. The trend ~n the eleva-
tor's DP charges for 1978 nearly equaled the 1982 trend, a period in 
which many elevators believed that the corn supply was adequate to meet 
demand (Table 3). 
1980 Time Period 
In 1980, the supply of corn and soybeans was relatively large 
implying that the demand for storage was increasing and that farmers 
were forced to move corn v~a DP and cash sale agreements. Since DP was 
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not substituted for stored corn, basis was not weakened. Assuming that 
the available supply of corn equaled the demand, the elevator may not 
have passed back all or part of the efficiency effect as higher prices 
to farmers. Therefore, the basis was not strengthened. The magnitude 
of the DP charges during the October through December period suggest 
that, in fact, corn supplies were adequate (Table 3). 
Conclusions and Implications 
Opponents of DP argue that the widespread use of the DP selling 
method by farmers weakens the basis in a local grain market. This 
argument was conceptualized in this paper by substitution of grain sold 
via the DP selling method for farmer stored grain. A similar substitu-
tion of grain sold via the DP selling method for cash grain sales proved 
to have a neutral effect on basis and cannot be used as an argument to 
support the views of the opponents. 
Proponents of DP argue that the use of the DP selling method by 
farmers strengthens the basis in a local grain market. Assuming that 
the hypothesized cost savings from the improved operational efficiency 
effect are passed back to farmers, this argument was also verified. 
Alternatively passing the cost savings forward to buyers in a regional 
market or retaining the cost savings by the elevator has a neutral 
effect on the basis and cannot be used as an argument to support the 
views of the proponents 
Although the conceptual model supports both the opponent's and 
proponent's arguments, the aggregated storage substitution effect versus 
the operational efficiency effect cannot be determined. There are three 
possible outcomes: i) the substitution effect is greater than the 
operational efficiency effect causing basis to weaken; ii) the substi-
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tution effect is less than the operational efficiency effect causing 
basis to strengthen; and iii) the substitution effect equals the 
operational efficiency effect and basis is unchanged. 
Empirically testing the aggregated impact of the substitution and 
operational efficiency effects proved to be difficult because of the 
limited availability of firm data. In one of the five year periods 
(1977), white noise could not be established for the data series. In 
two of the five year periods (1980 and 1982), DP sales strengthened the 
local basis, while in the remaining two years (1978 and 1981), no causal 
effect could be found. 
For the two years ~n which DP sales strengthened basis, the 
analysis suggests that the operational efficiency effect was greater 
than the substitution effects. Thus, the arguments of the proponents 
were supported. This relationship appears to exist when the demand for 
corn was large relative to the supply of corn and storage space was 
relatively available, such as in 1980 and 1982. 
When no causal relationship existed between DP and basis (1978 and 
1981), the substitution effects equaled the operational efficiency 
effect. Relative to the 1980 and 1982 periods, the substitution effects 
either increased or the operational efficiency effect decreased. This 
analysis could be used to suggest that the elevator did not always pass 
part or all of the cost savings from the operational efficiency effect 
back to farmers in years when an abundant supply of corn was available 
to meet demand and storage was in relative short supply. This appeared 
to be the situation for 1978 and 1981. Therefore, it is probable that 
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the operational efficiency effect declined as the elevator either passed 
the cost savings forward to its customers or increased its gross 
operating margin. 
Future empirical research should include data for additional years, 
more finns and states and employ pooled cross sectional time series 
analysis. Further, in this research it was assumed that operational 
efficiencies prevailed. The counter argument proposed by Good that 
operational inefficiencies exist as grain is stored at non-country sites 
was not examined. Case studies or engineering studies which examine the 
cost for storing grain at multiple locations within the marketing 
channel could resolve this debate. Including these storage cost data in 
the analysis may result in more consistent empirical findings. ~inally, 
research needs to be undertaken to determine which economic factors 
(supply, demand, storage, etc.) influence farmers and grain handlers to 
buy and sell grain via DP. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 Because of data omissions, the impact of DP on the 1979 daily 
basis is not investigated. 
2 Since the total supply function at harvest is perfectly 
inelastic, it is assumed that in the long run an individual 
grain handler cannot capture more grain from competitors by 
offering DP to his customers. 
3 Since grain markets are relatively competitive, pr~ce 
differentials between markets are correlated to transporta-
tion costs [Sappington, Hill and Baldwin]. 
4 Although other marketing alternatives such as hedging and forward 
contracts are available to farmers at harvest time, an evaluation 
of these alternatives is not required to satisfy the objective of 
the paper. 
5 Cash prices paid to farmers equal the nearby futures price plus the 
basis where the coefficient assigned to the basis is assumed to be 
negative (Cp = Fp +(-B). Therefore, if the theoretical analysis 
identifies a decrease (increase) in the cash price, by definition 
the basis becomes more (less) negative or weakens (strengthens). 
6 A stronger (narrower) basis is defined as an improved basis be-
cause the cash price bid to farmers increases in relation to the 
nearby futures price. A weaker (wider) basis ~s defined as a deterior-
ating basis as prices to farmers decrease in relation to the nearby 
futures price. 
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7 To validate whether the DP selling method causes operational 
inefficiencies [Good and Wills] or efficiencies [McKinstray ann 
OFBF] is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the theoreti-
cal impact of assumed operational efficiencies is examined. 
8 It is recognized that the gain from the efficiency effect could 
accure to the factor owners and to consumers, depending upon supply 
and demand elasticities. If all or part is transferred to consumers, 
the proponent's argument deteriorates. 
9 In this analysis, Grangers causality test 1s not used to represent a 
structural explanation of basis. Explanation of the differences in 
causal relationships (DP causes basis in year Yt and no causal rela-
tionship is found in Year Yt+l) among years is examined using reported 
delayed price serv1ce charges. Elevators decrease (increase) the 
delayed price service charge collected from farmers to encourage the 
substitution of the delayed price selling period (cash sales or stor-
age) for cash sales or storage (delayed price selling method). 
10 Because daily delayed price sales data were incomplete for 1979, 
data for this year were omitted. 
11 For this analysis, the basis coefficient was always negative as 
c t - Fp t < 0 p 
where c t = cash price paid to farmer in time period t. p 
F t == futures price of the nearby futures month l.n time p 
period t. 
12 White noise denotes a serially uncorrelated residual series. 
13 The use of daily cash bids to dealers as a proxy for farm bids does 
not effect the results of the study since the difference between the 
two bids remained constant throughout the study period. 
14 To protect the confidentiality of the data, the name and location of 
the elevator are not identified. 
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Table 1: Regression Estimates for Cbm Causal Mxlels for Harvest: Olio, 1977-B:z<l 
Year F-val R-2 
1977b 970.3 .99 
1978 1075.0 .97 
1900 160.48 .94 
1981 269.6 .98 
1982 151.5 .95 
Year DPt-2 
1977 .00000217 
( .077) 
1978 
1980 .000007783 
(-.363) 
1981 .000000246 
(2.927) 
1982 .000001339 
(-. 739) 
a 1979 exclooed 
M:>del = 
Int. 
-.5189 
(-1.337) 
.17719 
( .642) 
-3.954 
(-2.546) 
-2.07 
(-2.11) 
-2.08 
( -3.44) 
M N 
- B = 2: et .B . + E y .DP . 
t . 1 1 t-1 • 1 1 t-1 1= 1= 
Bt-l Bt-2 Bt-3 
1.356 -.2526 .2941 
(11.47) (-1.23) (-1.41) 
.2588 -2.638 
(10.02) (-2.012) 
1.343 .4621 
(10.24) ( -3.481) 
1.077 .16203 .1181 
(8.34) (. 797) ( .5877) 
1.236 -.32 
(10.39) (-2.76) 
Bt-4 
.3279 
(1.517) 
-.3403 
( -1.66) 
<Xm'INUATIOO OF INDEPENDENr VARIABLES 
DPt-3 DPt-4 DPt-5 DPt-6 
.000000982 
(3.593) 
.0000145 -. 000025 7953 
(1.123) ( -2.101) 
.00000425 .000004689 .00000994 .00001297 
(. 719) ( -. 79) (1.629) 91. 988) 
Bt-5 Bt-6 Bt-7 
-.1377 
( -1.05) 
.03865 -.44% .3655 
(.166) (-1.948) (2.614) 
D.F. 
57 
64 
57 
56 
54 
b 1977 estimates may be biased due to severe autocorrelation, Slin's Filter technique did not e1lininate autocorrelation. 
t-statistics for coefficients appear in parenthesis below relevant coefficients. 
DPt-] 
.<n:X)()0217 
(3.593) 
-.0000)107142 
(-.9()3) 
-.000000174 
( -.021) w 
-. 000004664 0 
( -. 739) 
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Table 2: Causality Tests With Delayed Price Corn Receipts and Basis for 
Harvest Periods: Ohio, 1977-82a 
F V A L U E 
B DP 
causes causes 
Year Models DP B 
1977 DPt f(5 lags DP) 1.54 --b 
1978 DPt f(5 lags DP, 5 lags B) 
Bt = f (2 lags B) 2.29 --b 
1980 DPt = f(5 lags DP, 2 lags B) 
Bt = f(2 lags B, 4 lags DP) 3.02 2.01 
1981 DPt f(6 lags DP) 
Bt f( 7 lags B, 2 lags DP) --b 5 .20* 
1982 DPt f(5 lags B, 5 lags DP) 
Bt = f(2 lags B, 6 lags DP) 2.15 2.27* 
a 1979 data excluded because of data omissions. 
D.F. 
55 
55 
55 
so 
53 
b F-tests not calculated for models with insignificant individual lags for 
independent variable. 
c 1977 Basis - DP sales causal relationship is not analyzed because 
filtering process did not establish a while noise series. 
* F statistic is significant at the .05 level. 
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Table 3: DP Corn Charges8 for an Ohio Elevator for Selected Dates 
1977-82b 
OCTOBER NOVEMBER DECEMBER 
Year Fixed Var. Ftxed Var. Fixed Var. 
1977 22 0 24 2 6 1.5 
1978 10 2 7 2 0 2 
1980 15 3 20 3 15 3 
1981 0 0 10 3 5 3 
1982 12 3 7 3 0 2 
a All charges expressed l.n cents/bu./month. 
b 1979 excluded. 
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